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Bridging the Enforcement Gap: 
Compliance of States Parties with Decisions
of Human Rights Treaty Bodies
The enforcement of judgments and
decisions of regional and international
human rights courts and treaty bodies
constitutes a litmus test for the
effectiveness of the international
human rights system. Delays and non-
compliance at the enforcement stage
pose a continuous challenge that
frustrates victims and threatens to
undermine the impact of human
rights treaty bodies’ decisions. Victims,
human rights lawyers, NGOs and the
human rights treaty bodies themselves
are increasingly aware of the need to
develop strategies and mechanisms
designed to speed up compliance with
relevant decisions. This article draws
on experiences of the international
human rights organisation REDRESS,
which has sought to challenge the lack
of timely compliance in its case work
before regional and international
bodies and has engaged in a series of
initiatives to strengthen compliance,
including convening a conference and
issuing a publication on enforcement.1
Human rights treaty bodies fall into
two broad categories: judicial bodies
that pass judgments, such as the
European Court of Human Rights (the
European Court), the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (the Inter-
American Court) and the African
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights
(the African Court), and quasi-judicial
bodies that issue views or
recommendations, such as the United
Nations (UN) treaty bodies, the Inter-
American Commission on Human
Rights and the African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights (the
African Commission). The respondent
state in a given case is expected to
comply with these judgments and
decisions by virtue of being a party that
has accepted obligations under the
relevant treaty. Judgments of judicial
bodies are often considered to carry
more weight because of their binding
nature. Decisions of quasi-judicial
bodies arguably also entail a duty of
compliance for the state party
concerned in as much as they are
declaratory of a state party’s obligation
under the treaty in question.2
Compliance Record of States Parties
It is difficult to establish precisely
states’ actual compliance records
under the various mechanisms but
reports by treaty bodies and studies
show that there are often serious
delays or a total failure to comply.3 As a
general rule, there appears to be a
higher degree of compliance with
judgments by judicial bodies, namely
the European Court and the Inter-
American Court. This can be attributed
to the judicial and binding nature of
judgments. The specificity with which
the measures a state party ought to
take are defined in the particular ruling
also facilitates compliance.
A further factor is the more integrated
nature of these regional human rights
systems, which translates into greater
acceptance by states parties. However,
even here, compliance is often
confined to paying compensation and
in some instances making restitution
and/or adopting measures to prevent
recurrence, such as legislative reforms,
albeit often only belatedly. 
States parties’ compliance with
decisions of the African Commission
and the UN treaty bodies has been
comparatively weaker due to a number
of factors, which include the fact that
decisions are often vague, the lack of
adequate national legal frameworks
and institutional follow-up mechan-
isms and a lesser incentive to comply
in face of limited political motivation to
do so.4
A feature common to all systems is
that states have largely failed to
investigate and prosecute those
responsible for violations, which can
be attributed to legal obstacles, such as
statutes of limitations, practical
difficulties of investigating crimes
many years after the event and a lack of
political will. 
Nature and Impact of Delays and Non-
enforcement
Delays are a source of immense
frustration and injustice. They can be
the cause of further suffering for the
victims induced by uncertainty and are
prone to undermine the satisfaction
derived from a positive judgment or
decision. Delays may hinder the efforts
of victims of serious violations such as
torture to rebuild their lives through
resolving the legal aspects of their
experiences; even worse, delays can
actually contribute to the
traumatisation of victims. 
All human rights treaty bodies are
faced with delays, which denote an
unreasonable length of time in
complying with a judgment or
decision. Most human rights treaty
bodies specify the period within which
states parties have to comply and to
take certain measures (or inform the
body of the measures taken).5 There
may be circumstances that genuinely
prevent the state party in question
from complying with the indicated
time period, such as the need for a
change in legislation. In these cases,
drawing on standards developed in
international jurisprudence, factors
such as the complexity of the measures
in question, may be taken into
consideration in determining what
constitutes an unreasonable time in
the given circumstances.6
Delays are a form of partial non-
compliance in their own right and it is
often difficult to determine whether
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delays are due to genuine difficulties
experienced by states parties or are a
sign of non-compliance.7 The latter
would appear to be the case where
there is no prospect that the state party
will take the required action, which
may take the form of an outright
refusal or apparent unwillingness to
comply with the decision(s) in the
particular case, or be a matter of
habitual practice.
Lengthy delays are often an indication
of a more fundamental problem of a
state’s systemic non-compliance with
its treaty obligations. Systemic delays,
including at the enforcement stage,
produce invisible and pernicious,
though not necessarily unintended,
effects by sending a message to victims
of human rights violations that it is not
worthwhile pursuing cases. This may
act as a powerful inhibitor that can
make victims of violations think twice
before bringing cases before a regional
or international human rights treaty
body and, in so doing, undermines the
right to an effective remedy. 
Seeking Enforcement 
The human rights treaty body
concerned commonly specifies the
adequate remedies a state ought to take
within a given timeframe in response
to the violations found.8 For a remedy
to be effective, therefore, there should
be no unreasonable delays in any
proceedings, including at the
enforcement stage, and in providing
the requisite reparation measures. In
spite of their right to an effective
remedy,9 which entails that a decision
is complied with, and the
corresponding obligation of states
parties, individuals often do not obtain
the reparation awarded within the
timeframe set by the treaty bodies. If
faced with such a situation, individuals
and lawyers acting on their behalf need
to develop a strategy on how best to
seek implementation of the ruling in
question.
In addition to continuously informing
the relevant treaty body itself about the
status of compliance and requesting it
to follow-up with the state party,
individuals may approach the
responsible government bodies of the
state party directly. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that individuals stand a
higher chance of obtaining timely
compliance, or any compliance for that
matter, in particular with regard to
compensation, where: the decision of
the treaty body specifies the remedies
to be taken;10 the decisions of the
treaty body commands sufficient
respect; there is adequate follow-up;
human rights lawyers and NGOs are
involved, including by using litigation
as ‘an advocacy tool’;11 and, crucially,
the state authorities are in principle
willing to comply with the ruling, at
least in parts. 
Where this direct approach fails,
individuals may have to seek recourse
to domestic courts. This will inevitably
add another layer of delays to
proceedings but may prove to be an
effective avenue where domestic
legislation is in place that either
recognises the decisions of human
rights treaty bodies as binding or
allows enforcement for such types of
cases. It may also be effective where
domestic courts are receptive to
interpreting domestic legislation in
line with a state party’s international
obligations. Actual state practice in this
respect is patchy. Several states in Latin
America and Europe have passed
legislation that provides for special
procedures for the implementation of
judgments of the respective regional
treaty bodies.12
National and international
human rights lawyers and
NGOs have arguably paid
insufficient attention to the
importance of compliance with
human rights treaty body
decisions in the past, both in
terms of seeking justice in the
individual case and in ensuring
the effectiveness of the system
concerned at the domestic
level. 
States such as Italy, Poland, Turkey and
Russia have passed legislation aimed at
providing effective domestic remedies
in relation to specific violations of the
European Convention on Human
Rights that may also benefit
individuals who had previously
obtained a favourable judgment or
whose cases are pending.13 However, a
number of domestic courts have been
reluctant to recognise the binding
nature of decisions by UN treaty
bodies. In a glaring example,
Nallaratnam Singarasa, who had been
convicted under the Prevention of
Terrorism Act in Sri Lanka on the basis
of a confession extracted under torture,
was denied a retrial by the Sri Lankan
Supreme Court in spite of a UN
Human Rights Committee decision to
release him or grant him a retrial.14
Where the state party is not responsive
to formal approaches and there are no
effective legal or judicial domestic
avenues, individuals may have to resort
to publicity and advocacy. Such efforts
may concern the individual case but
may also include systemic issues, such
as the lack of legal avenues to comply
with human rights treaty body
decisions and the need for reforms.
Human rights lawyers and NGOs that
represent victims of violations or work
to strengthen the effectiveness of
international human rights treaty
bodies at the domestic level play an
important role in taking up these
issues. National and international
human rights lawyers and NGOs have
arguably paid insufficient attention to
the importance of compliance with
human rights treaty body decisions in
the past. However, there is a growing
awareness of the need to strengthen
efforts and to become more strategic in
following-up decisions and in raising
the issue.15
Individuals may also bring new cases
before the human rights treaty body in
question to challenge domestic non-
enforcement. This may appear to be a
futile exercise given that the state party
has already failed to comply; why
should a different outcome be expected
following a new decision in the same
vein? However, from a policy and
advocacy perspective, such a complaint
may be highly significant. It can result
in a judicial or quasi-judicial
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condemnation of the lack of
compliance. It can also expose a state
party that repeatedly fails to comply
with decisions as a ‘persistent
offender’ that denies remedies and
reparation to the victims of violations
even where a regional or an
international human rights treaty body
has requested or ordered it to do so.
The European system has responded
to systemic violations and lack of
domestic remedies by applying the so-
called pilot judgment procedure
(further explained below) and by
empowering the European Court to
find a violation where the subject-
matter of the case ‘is already the
subject of well-established case-law of
the Court’.16 A favourable decision in
such a case may prompt the treaty and
political bodies in charge of
monitoring human rights compliance
to bring pressure to bear on the state
party concerned; it may also provide an
impetus for domestic advocacy efforts
to induce the state party to change its
conduct or even legislation with regard
to compliance with treaty body
decisions. In the case of Sri Lanka, for
example, human rights lawyers and
human rights organisations have
challenged the denial of an effective
remedy resulting from the Supreme
Court’s judgment in the Singarasa case
(see above) and its adverse
implications for enforcement in recent
communications pending before the
UN Human Rights Committee.  
Institutional Responses: Strength-
ening Mechanisms to Enhance
Compliance
The foregoing practical considerations
are necessitated by a simple reality: the
general weakness of the enforcement
system of regional and international
human rights treaty bodies. The treaty
regime relating to complaints
mechanisms is based on the premise
that states will automatically comply
with decisions, which explains the lack
of a developed legal framework
governing enforcement. This includes
the absence of explicit powers given to
the human rights treaty bodies
themselves to ensure compliance. In
light of the threat to their authority and
the effectiveness of the human rights
treaty system inherent in partial or
complete non-compliance, human
rights treaty bodies have developed
various institutional responses to
delays and non-compliance with their
decisions. 
In what is arguably the weakest
mechanism, the African Commission
has requested states to include
information on compliance in their
periodic reports and has established a
working group on follow-up
mechanisms to ensure compliance.17
The Protocol to the African
Commission seeks to strengthen
enforcement for cases decided by the
African Court.18
UN human rights treaty bodies have
appointed special rapporteurs to
follow-up decisions.19 This can result
in the naming and shaming of states
parties in case of non-compliance but
the impact of follow-up procedures has
been limited.20
The Inter-American Court has
assumed powers to monitor
compliance with its judgments.21
While the lack of a formal enforcement
procedure has arguably weakened the
effectiveness of its role in the follow-
up, the Court has recently started to
use innovative methods, such as
conducting hearings on compliance
and the setting up of tripartite
structures to decide on the use of trust
funds for groups of victims
(representatives appointed by the
victims and the state respectively, and
another representative appointed
jointly by both), with a view to
facilitating implementation.22
The enforcement system under the
European Court is characterised by the
powers given to the Committee of
Ministers to supervise the execution of
judgments pursuant to Article 46(2) of
the European Convention on Human
Rights. The Committee of Ministers
has developed a detailed monitoring
system and has encouraged states to
strengthen their capacity to comply
with judgments.23 The European
Court itself has taken a stronger and
more effective role in ensuring
compliance in cases of systemic
problems such as delays in domestic
proceedings and the lack of domestic
remedies, referred to as ‘dysfunction’,
by using ‘’pilot-judgments’.24 These
judgments are effectively precedents,
which compel states parties to put in
place effective domestic remedies or
risk a large number of adverse
judgments by the European Court.25
The role of the European Court has
recently been strengthened with the
coming into force of the 14th Protocol: 
If the Committee of Ministers
considers that a High Contracting
Party refuses to abide by a final
judgment in a case to which it is a
party, it may, after serving formal
notice on that Party and by decision
adopted by a majority vote of two thirds
of the representatives entitled to sit on
the Committee, refer to the Court the
question whether that Party has failed
to fulfil its obligation under paragraph
1.26
The various follow-up procedures are
important but will have limited impact
so long as key causes for delays and
non-compliance are not tackled
effectively. Steps to be taken include
the development of jurisprudence that:
specifies the form of restitution and
the amount of compensation; spells
out in considerable detail the
obligation to investigate and prosecute;
and stipulates other forms of
satisfaction, including legislative and
institutional reforms or other
measures as appropriate. The treaty
body should seek to engage the state
party in order to facilitate compliance,
There is also a need for continuous
engagement to ensure that states put
in place an adequate framework for
compliance. 
Equally important is the readiness of
the relevant political bodies, such as
the UN Human Rights Council, the
Council of Europe, the Organisation of
American States or the African Union,
to take policy measures that strengthen
the enforcement system as a whole and
to impose tangible sanctions in case of
unacceptable delays or non-
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compliance. Further action is needed
to overcome the gap between rulings
made and levels of compliance if the
complaints mechanisms are to become
truly effective. Victims of human rights
violations who will have often waited
for several years to obtain reparation,
and others whose rights have been
violated or are at risk, deserve no less
than a concerted effort by all regional
and international human rights
mechanisms to combat and drastically
reduce delays and non-compliance.
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